CVE-2026-68433 — libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len a…
Published: 2026-08-12 · CVSS: 8.6 · CVSS 3.1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read. Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire.
Source: CVE Program · Revision 8b16575c39f1e1810c5e863010da073d2d3285e7