CVE-2026-48501 — GitHub CLI tokens leak via `gh attestation` commands
GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.93.0, GitHub CLI incorrectly includes authorization header in API requests to TUF repository mirrors via gh at…
Published: 2026-05-29 · CVSS: 7.4 · CVSS 3.1
GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.93.0, GitHub CLI incorrectly includes authorization header in API requests to TUF repository mirrors via gh attestation, gh release verify, and gh release verify-asset commands. The CLI uses a shared HTTP client with an authentication layer that automatically attaches tokens to outgoing requests. This layer lacks accurate host detection and can incorrectly attribute the target host, providing it with a token it should never receive. Specifically, the host normalization logic collapses any *.github.com subdomain to github.com, so a request to tuf-repo.github.com (a GitHub Pages site, not a GitHub API endpoint) is treated as a request to github.com and receives the user's github.com token. For hosts that don't match github.com or a known GHES instance at all, the resolver falls back to GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN if set. The gh attestation, gh release verify and gh release verify-asset commands fetch data from several external hosts as part of their normal operation (TUF metadata from tuf-repo.github.com and tuf-repo-cdn.sigstore.dev, artifact bundles from Azure Blob Storage). Because these requests go through the same authenticated HTTP client, the token is sent to all of them. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.93.0.
Source: CVE Program · Revision 8b16575c39f1e1810c5e863010da073d2d3285e7