CVE-2026-47174 — Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy …
Published: 2026-06-11 · CVSS: 9.5 · CVSS 4.0
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
Source: CVE Program · Revision 8b16575c39f1e1810c5e863010da073d2d3285e7