CVE-2026-45843 — slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TC…
Published: 2026-05-27 · CVSS: 8.2 · CVSS 3.1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TCP header by advancing a pointer through the packet via decode() and pull16(). Neither helper bounds-checks against isize, and decode() masks its return with & 0xffff so it can never return the -1 that callers test for -- those error paths are dead code. A short compressed frame whose change byte requests optional fields lets decode() read past the end of the packet. The over-read bytes are folded into the cached cstate and reflected into subsequent reconstructed packets. Make decode() and pull16() take the packet end pointer and return -1 when exhausted. Add a bounds check before the TCP-checksum read. The existing == -1 tests now do what they were always meant to.
Source: CVE Program · Revision 8b16575c39f1e1810c5e863010da073d2d3285e7