CVE-2026-17534 — Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS …
Published: 2026-07-27 · CVSS: 5.5 · CVSS 3.1
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
Source: CVE Program · Revision 8b16575c39f1e1810c5e863010da073d2d3285e7